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Many important moral decisions, particularly at
the policy level, require the evaluation of choices
involving outcomes of variable magnitude and prob-
ability. Many economic decisions involve the same
problem. It is not known whether and to what extent
these structurally isomorphic decisions rely on
common neural mechanisms. Subjects undergoing
fMRI evaluated the moral acceptability of sacrificing
a single life to save a larger group of variable size
and probability of dying without action. Paralleling
research on economic decision making, the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum were
specifically sensitive to the ‘‘expected moral value’’
of actions, i.e., the expected number of lives lost/
saved. Likewise, the right anterior insula was specif-
ically sensitive to outcome probability. Other regions
tracked outcome certainty and individual differences
in utilitarian tendency. The present results suggest
that complex life-and-death moral decisions that
affect others depend on neural circuitry adapted for
more basic, self-interested decision making involv-
ing material rewards.
INTRODUCTION
The most consequential moral decisions that humans make are
at the policy level, where a single choice can significantly impact
thousands of lives. Examples include healthcare decisions, such
as the adoption of an opt-out versus opt-in system for organ
donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003), and military decisions,
such as U.S. President Harry Truman’s decision to deploy
nuclear weapons against Japan. Such decisions have several
notable features. First, they involve trade-offs among costs
and benefits of varying magnitude. Second, they involve uncer-
tainty, with outcomes that vary in their probability of occurrence.
Third, such decisions often involve life-and-death outcomes for
individuals other than the decision maker, requiring the decision
maker to assess the value of these lives and incorporate such
assessments into a decision. Fourth, the individuals who make
policy decisions (voters, legislators, judges, government offi-cials, etc.) are, at best, indirectly affected by the social utility of
their choices and may be completely unaffected by it. The
present research examines moral decisions with these four crit-
ical features, which reflect the complexity, seriousness, and indi-
rect social nature of important policy decisions. In functional
terms, the present research examines how the brain represents
and integrates information concerning the magnitude and prob-
ability of outcomes in decisions with life-and-death implications
for unknown others.
The present research aims to draw parallels between
economic and moral decision making. This endeavor is signifi-
cant in two ways. First, it addresses a central question in the
study of moral judgment, namely the extent to which moral
judgments draw on domain-general versus domain-specific
processes (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Hauser, 2006). Some have
argued that moral judgments are produced by a ‘‘moral faculty’’
independent of and prior to processing by affective/emotional
circuitry in the brain (Hauser, 2006; Huebner et al., 2009).
Evidence that such judgments are produced by domain-general,
affective mechanisms of evaluation would therefore count
against the hypothesis that such judgments are produced
by a domain-specific moral faculty. Second, in drawing this
parallel, the present research would significantly expand the
purview of ‘‘neuroeconomic’’ models of valuation (Glimcher,
2009; Rangel et al., 2008; Wallis, 2007). Research on economic
decision making has examined the neural systems responsible
for tracking and integrating information concerning outcome
magnitude and probability (Knutson et al., 2005; Platt and
Huettel, 2008; Tom et al., 2007). However, such research has
focused on decisions involving primary reinforcers or monetary
outcomes for the decision maker, while the present research
examines decisions involving life-and-death outcomes that
affect unknown others rather than the decision maker. Thus,
the present research tests the generality of neuroeconomic
models that aspire to provide a comprehensive framework for
subjective valuation and decision making (Glimcher, 2009;
Montague and Berns, 2002). We hypothesize that the relatively
detached moral decisions examined here rely on domain-
general evaluation mechanisms that enable more basic, self-
interested decision making in humans and animals.
Several studies have parametrically varied the probability
and magnitude of positive and/or negative outcomes to identify
brain regions and neurotransmitter systems responsible for
representing these variables and integrating them into a subjec-
tive summary representation of expected value. Such decisionsNeuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 667
+Figure 1. Task Timeline for a Single Func-
tional Run
Subjects progress through four screens de-
scribing the dilemma context, a default action
(saving one individual with certainty), and a
proposed alternate action to be evaluated (saving
a group of individuals who might otherwise be
saved with a known probability). This is followed
by ten trials in which the group size (Magnitude)
and probability that the group will be saved by
other means (100 – Probability) are specified.
Subjects morally evaluate the proposed action
using a five-point scale. Trials are self-paced
(up to 10 s) and followed by a 10 s fixed intertrial
interval (ITI).
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Moral Judgments Recruit Core Evaluative Mechanismsinvolve, in different ways, subcortical regions in the striatum,
thalamus, and amygdala as well as cortical regions in the cingu-
late cortex, insula, ventromedial prefrontal/medial orbitofrontal
cortex (vmPFC/mOFC), and posterior parietal cortex (Knutson
et al., 2005; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Tom et al., 2007). The
vmPFC/mOFC in particular appears to be specialized for repre-
senting the overall expected value/utility associated with an
option (Hare et al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2005; Wallis, 2007).
We hypothesize that at least some of these neural structures
will play comparable roles in the complex moral decisions exam-
ined here. Previous research on other-regarding preferences in
the context of resource allocation (Hare et al., 2010; Hsu et al.,
2008; Moll et al., 2006) are consistent with this hypothesis, but
these studies examine decisions involving familiar economic
goods and do not (explicitly) involve uncertainty. The present
study, in contrast, examines representations of the value of
life-and-death outcomes and how these representations are
modulated by uncertainty.
The present research also builds on recent research exam-
ining hypothetical life-and-death moral dilemmas (Foot, 1978;
Thomson, 1986) in which one can save several lives by sacri-
ficing a smaller number of lives (Greene, 2009; Greene et al.,
2001). Neuroscientific studies employing such dilemmas have
examined several critical factors, such as the distinction
between action and omission and the distinction between
harm as a means and harm as a side-effect (Schaich Borg
et al., 2006), but have yet to examinemanipulations of probability
and magnitude, which are critical for real-world, complex deci-
sion making. The present study uses a parametric design to
examine these variables and their neural representation. This
additionally allows us to examine individual differences in both
neural and behavioral sensitivity to these variables and to
examine the relationship between neural sensitivity and behav-
ioral sensitivity to these variables.668 Neuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Our first aim is to identify neural struc-
tures responsible for encoding themagni-
tude and probability of outcomes and
subjective representations of the overall
‘‘expected moral value’’ of morally signif-
icant actions. Our second aim is to deter-
mine the extent to which these neural
structures are consistent with those impli-cated in more conventional economic decision making (Knutson
et al., 2005; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Sanfey et al., 2006; Wallis,
2007). More specifically, we aim to determine whether particular
brain regions that are predictive of behavioral risk and value
sensitivity in more conventional paradigms (Knutson et al.,
2005; Paulus et al., 2003) play comparable roles in the context
of moral judgment. This will be accomplished by identifying
neural regions whose activity covaries with the relevant task
parameters as well as regions associated with individual differ-
ences in behavioral sensitivity to these parameters. Recent
studies of moral judgment (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Greene
et al., 2004, 2008; Koenigs et al., 2007) suggest that automatic
emotional responses often conflict with utilitarian judgments.
In light of this, our third aim is to identify neural activity associ-
ated with individual differences in willingness to endorse utili-
tarian trade-offs (Hsu et al., 2008) and to determine, more specif-
ically, whether increased endorsement relies on neural circuitry
involved in emotion regulation (Hooker and Knight, 2006; Wager
et al., 2008). Our final aim is to identify patterns of neural activity
associated with decisions in which the outcomes are more
versus less certain, testing the hypothesis that moral judgments
involving more certain outcomes are more likely to depend on
mechanisms for rule-guided choice, typically enabled by the
lateral PFC (Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Greene et al., 2004;
Miller and Cohen, 2001).
RESULTS
Subjects undergoing fMRI judged the moral acceptability of
actions (e.g., turning a rescue boat away from a drowning man)
that would result in the certain death of one individual (Figure 1).
Each such action would also prevent (with certainty) the deaths
of a group of individuals (e.g., a group drowning in the opposite
direction). These deaths would otherwise be prevented with
A B Figure 2. Distribution of Trial Values and
Ratings of Moral Acceptability
Subjects’ judgments did not reverse sharply when
the relative values of the two options reversed.
Instead they exhibited a more graded sensitivity
to ‘‘Expected Moral Value.’’
(A) The trial value space from which Magnitude-
Probability pairs were randomly drawn for each
trial. Forty-eight possible trial/action types are
color coded by Expected Value (number of lives
expected to be saved through action). Actions/
trials with an Expected Value < 1 (the amount
required to match the certain death of one indi-
vidual abandoned by acting) are in red, and those
with value > 1 (net gain) are in blue.
(B) Average moral acceptability ratings across trial
value space reveal a graded behavioral sensitivity
to ‘‘Expected Moral Value’’ and its components.
See also Figure S1.
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Moral Judgments Recruit Core Evaluative Mechanismssome known probability (e.g., by an alternate rescue boat). This
probability and the outcome magnitude (size of group saved)
were varied parametrically across trials, thus varying the overall
expected value of performing the action, i.e., the expected
number of lives saved/lost. Figure 2A shows the entire set of
possible trial values, color-coded according to the expected value
of the proposed action (defined here as a simple multiplicative
interaction of outcome magnitude and probability). Blue and red,
respectively, indicate values above and below the ‘‘break-even
point,’’ i.e., the set of points at which the number of expected
lives saved and the number of expected lives lost both equal 1.
Behavioral Results
Subjects’ ratings of the moral acceptability of proposed actions
were examined using a mixed-effects multiple regression model
with subject entered as a random effect. Judgments were highly
sensitive to the number of lives at stake (Magnitude, natural log-
transformed) (t(33,1) = 9.38), the probability that these lives
would be lost without action (Probability) (t(33,1) = 15.1), and
the Expected Value of the action (Magnitude 3 Probability)
(t(33,1) = 4.06) (All p values < 0.0005; See Figure 2B). The direc-
tions of these effects were consistent with classical economic
models, with subjects’ judging it more acceptable to actively
sacrifice a life when inaction involves larger and more probable
losses of life. Contrary to models based on linearly increasing
utility from lives saved, subjects’ indifference thresholds (based
on acceptability ratings) were shifted upward from the break-
even point and did not drop off sharply at any point (see
Figure 2B). A follow-up experiment verified that this shift in indif-
ference from the break-even point was not a consequence of
using a Likert scale rather than a binary choice between
outcomes (see Experimental Procedures and see Figure S1
available online). A second follow-up experiment verified that
a significant shift in indifference away from the break-even point
is still present when a Loss frame (lives will be lostwithout action)
is used instead of a Gain frame (lives will be saved by acting).
(one-sample t(21) = 2.47, two-tailed p < 0.05; see Figure S1D)
Consistent with previous research (Petrinovich and O’Neill,
1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), subjects were marginally
less risk averse (i.e., more willing to take a chance on savingthe larger group) under the Loss frame (comparison of regression
intercepts: two-sample t(43) = 1.64, one-tailed p = 0.055;
Figure S1). Likewise, contrary to normative models that value
all lives equally, acceptability ratings more closely tracked
a natural-log transformation ofmagnitude (R2 = 0.60) than a linear
function of magnitude (R2 = 0.48). This is consistent with the
implication of a primitive, analog system for representing
approximate magnitudes using a logarithmic scale (Dehaene
et al., 1999; Nieder and Miller, 2003), as well as psychophysical
models of sensory processes (Thurstone, 1954) and models of
economic valuation and diminishing marginal utility (Bernoulli,
1954). (Henceforth, we use ‘‘Magnitude’’ to refer to ln(Magni-
tude).) RT’s were not significantly influenced by Magnitude and
Probability (t(32.3,1) = 1.37, p = 0.18; t(32.9,1) = 1.23, p =
0.23, respectively), but were faster as Expected Value increased
(t(32.1,1) = 3.75, p = 0.0007).
Neuroimaging Results
Magnitude, Probability, and Expected Value
We performed whole-brain analyses to identify brain regions ex-
hibiting parametric increases in BOLD signal specifically tracking
increases in outcome Magnitude, Probability, and Expected
Value (Magnitude3Probability interaction). We observed a posi-
tive correlation withMagnitude in bilateral regions of anterior and
posterior cingulate cortices, central insula, putamen, and inferior
parietal lobe, among other regions (Figure 3A; Table 1). We found
comparable sensitivity to Probability (greater signal in response
to higher probability of loss through inaction, raising the relative
value of action) in left dorsal posterior insula, putamen, ventral
posterolateral thalamus, and right posterior cingulate cortex,
among other regions (Figure 3B; Table 1). No regions exhibited
significant effects opposite to these. Our serially orthogonalized
regression procedure allowed us to examine parametric sensi-
tivity to Expected Value over and above sensitivity to its two
components (Magnitude and Probability). We observed positive
correlations between BOLD signal and Expected Value bilater-
ally in vmPFC/mOFC, precuneus, and inferior parietal lobe, left
mediodorsal thalamus, left ventrolateral PFC, and left superior
temporal sulcus (Figure 4; Table 1). No opposite effects were
observed.Neuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 669
A B Figure 3. Brain Regions Tracking Variations
in Magnitude and Probability
(A) Regions including the posterior cingulate
cortex, central insula, putamen, and inferior pari-
etal lobe exhibited significant parametric
increases in BOLD activity with logarithmically
increasing number of lives potentially saved/lost
(Magnitude).
(B) Regions including the left dorsal posterior
insula, putamen, ventral posterolateral thalamus,
and right posterior cingulate cortex exhibited
significant parametric increases in BOLD activity
with linearly increasing probability that the action
is necessary to save the group (Probability). No
regions exhibited effects opposite those shown
in (A) and (B). Statistical maps represent t values
thresholded at a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.005
and a clusterwise threshold of p < 0.05.
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of Life
The above whole-brain analyses may fail to identify effects that
are modulated by individual differences in sensitivity to our
parameters of interest. For this reason we performed additional
analyses to interrogate a priori ROIs previously identified as rele-
vant to individual differences in analogous decision tasks. BOLD
activity in the right anterior insula (R-aIns) has been shown to
increase with the contemplation of riskier choices, and to corre-
late with avoidant traits both in individual studies (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005; Paulus et al., 2003; Venkatraman et al., 2009)
and in a recent meta-analysis of the literature on risk processing
(Mohr et al., 2010). This suggests that BOLD signal in this region
may correlate with individual differences in sensitivity to the
Probability parameter (i.e., increased probability of the group’s
death) in the current paradigm. To test this hypothesis, we
extracted averaged Probability contrast estimates (i.e., BOLD
sensitivity to Probability) for each subject from an a priori spher-
ical ROI centered on the R-aIns focus of activation in Paulus et al.
(2003) (Figure 5A). We compared these individual estimates of
R-aIns sensitivity to an estimate of how sensitive each subject’s
moral judgments were to the Probability parameter (i.e., least-
squares estimates from a regression of acceptability ratings on
each of our parameters). As predicted, we found that neural
sensitivity to Probability in the R-aIns was correlated with behav-
ioral sensitivity to Probability (r = 0.38, p = 0.02; Figure 5B). That
is, the degree to which an individual’s moral judgments were
influenced by the likelihood of the group’s death was predicted
by the degree to which that individual’s R-aIns was sensitive to
this same parameter.
Behavioral and Neural Sensitivity to Expected Value
Regions of ventral striatum (vStr) have been consistently shown
to encode reward value and reward prediction errors across
a wide array of reinforcers (Knutson et al., 2005; O’Doherty
et al., 2004). Likewise, activity in these regions is known to corre-
late with individual sensitivity to reward gains relative to losses
(Tom et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2009). We extracted aver-
aged Expected Value contrast estimates (i.e., BOLD sensitivity
to Expected Value) for each subject from bilateral ROI’s centered
on the vStr foci of activation in Knutson et al. (2005) (Figure 5C).670 Neuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.As predicted, these estimates were significantly correlated
(left: r = 0.51, p = 0.005; right: r = 0.55, p = 0.002) with individual
behavioral Expected Value beta estimates (i.e., sensitivity of
moral judgments to Expected Value) (Figure 5D). Thus, across
individuals, BOLD sensitivity to ‘‘expected moral value’’ (Magni-
tude3 Probability) in the ventral striatum correlates with behav-
ioral sensitivity to that factor.
Individual Differences in Utilitarian Tendency
Individuals vary in their tendency toward utilitarian judgment
(Bartels, 2008; Greene et al., 2004), which in the present context
refers to the approval of allowing one person’s death in order to
save a larger number of lives. Across subjects, higher mean
acceptability ratings reflect greater approval of utilitarian trade-
offs. We performed a whole-brain analysis across subjects,
regressing each subject’s average BOLD signal during the trial
period (relative to fixation baseline) against his/her average
acceptability rating. We found that increased utilitarian respond-
ing at the individual level was correlated with increased BOLD
activity in bilateral regions of lateral OFC/vlPFC andmedial supe-
rior frontal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus and superior parietal
lobe (Figure 6; Table S1). No regions exhibited the opposite
pattern of activity.
Encoding/Response to Outcome Certainty
It is likely that moral judgments made under conditions of uncer-
tainty are different from thosemade under conditions of certainty.
Previous research employing moral dilemmas with certain out-
comes has associated utilitarian judgment with activity in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and corresponding regions
in the parietal lobes, and it has been proposed that such effects
reflect the application of a utilitarian decision rule (Greene et al.,
2001, 2004). This suggests that such regions will exhibit greater
activity in the present context as the outcomes in question
become more certain. To identify brain regions sensitive to out-
come certainty, we included in our full parametric regression
model (along with ln(Magnitude), Probability, and Expected
Value) a quadratic Probability term describing a ‘‘U-shaped’’
responseprofile forBOLDactivityacrossprobabilities (i.e., activity
varying with increasing distance from 50% chance of group
survival). This analysis revealed regions exhibiting increased
BOLD signal with increasing certainty in bilateral vlPFC,
Table 1. Result of aWhole-Brain Analysis Identifying Brain Regions Sensitive to OutcomeMagnitude, Probability, and Expected Value
Regressor Side Region(s) Cluster Extent Peak Z score Peak MNI Coordinates
(voxels) X Y Z
Magnitude
L cIns, putamen, premotor 2211 4.68 42 4 6
B Cerebellum, lingual gyrus, R extrastriate 3819 4.55 2 60 4
R Premotor, precentral gyrus 268 4.49 52 2 40
B ACC, SMA 925 4.30 8 6 62
L Inferior temporal cortex, fusiform gyrus 208 4.02 46 62 10
B PCC 1189 4.01 8 30 48
L Anterior parahippocampal gyrus 250 3.79 30 12 30
R cIns, putamen 520 3.79 54 8 2
L IPL, SII 363 3.76 56 34 24
R SFG, MFG 279 3.73 26 48 36
R IPL, SII 448 3.71 64 36 26
L LOC 216 3.68 42 86 18
Probability
R Lingual gyrus, cerebellum 530 4.17 6 74 0
L VPL thalamus, putamen 198 4.15 20 22 2
L LOC 243 3.99 46 66 20
L Dorsal posterior insula 215 3.93 38 22 26
L Precentral/postcentral gyri 299 3.69 16 28 62
R PCC 239 3.56 28 36 36
Expected Value
L STS 735 4.17 46 10 22
B PCC, precuneus, RSC 1450 4.03 8 64 24
B vmPFC/mOFC, frontal pole 758 3.90 4 56 12
L MD/VL thalamus 243 3.89 14 14 6
L IPL 452 3.85 42 60 18
L vlPFC, IFG 186 3.80 52 30 0
R IPL 229 3.63 52 54 26
Regions exhibiting significant parametric increases in BOLD activity with linearly increasing (A) Magnitude (larger number of lives saved through
action), (B) Probability of saving lives through action, (C) Expected Value of proposed action. Significant clusters met a voxelwise threshold of p <
0.005 and a clusterwise threshold of p < 0.05. L, left; R, right; B, bilateral. cIns, central insula; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex, SMA, supplementary
motor area; SII, secondary somatosensory area; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; LOC, lateral occipital cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex; VPL, vental posterolateral; STS, superior temporal sulcus; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; RSC, retrosplenial cortex; vmPFC, ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex; mOFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; MD, medial dorsal; VL, ventral lateral; IFG, inferior
frontal gyrus.
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(Figure 7; Table S2). No regions exhibited significant reverse
effects.
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the neural mechanisms responsible
for making complex moral decisions involving outcomes (lives
saved/lost) of variable magnitude and probability and hence
options that varied in expected value. Our results indicate that
the mechanisms that enable such decisions overlap consider-
ably with those that enable more familiar self-interested deci-
sions (Knutson et al., 2005; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Tom et al.,
2007). Most notably, we found that BOLD signal in the vmPFC/mOFC correlated with the ‘‘expected moral value’’ of decision
options, i.e., the interaction between magnitude and probability.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that this region supports
the integration of positive and negative reward signals into
a more abstract representation of value, a kind of decision
‘‘currency’’ (Chib et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2008; Kringelbach
and Rolls, 2004; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Padoa-Schioppa,
2007; Wallis, 2007). The present results suggest that the
vmPFC/mOFC, in addition to representing the subjective value
of material gains and losses that may accrue to the decision-
maker, has been recruited to represent hypothetical gains and
losses, including gains and losses of life, that may accrue to
others, but that have no material bearing on the decision maker.
While we have used an objective stimulus parameter (expectedNeuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 671
Figure 4. Regions Exhibiting Significant Parametric Increases in
BOLD Activity with Linearly Increasing Number of Lives Expected
to Be Saved (Expected Value)
Paralleling results of several studies of economic decision making, the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (see arrows) was specifically sensitive to the
‘‘expected moral value’’ of actions. Other regions, including the precuneus,
inferior parietal lobe, left mediodorsal thalamus, left ventrolateral PFC, and
left superior temporal sulcus, exhibited this effect as well. No regions exhibited
opposite effects. Statisticalmaps represent t values thresholded at a voxelwise
threshold of p < 0.005 and a clusterwise threshold of p < 0.05.
r = 0.38
p= 0.02
r = 0.51
p= 0.005
r = 0.55
p= 0.002
A B
DC
Figure 5. Correlations between Behavioral and Neural Sensitivity to
Risk and Value within Three Spherical A Priori ROIs
(A) A region of right anterior insula identified by Paulus et al. (2003) as sensitive
to risk and correlated with harm avoidance.
(B) Individuals’ neural sensitivity to Probability in this region of insula correlates
with individuals’ behavioral sensitivity to Probability.
(C) Bilateral regions of ventral striatum identified by Knutson et al. (2005) as
sensitive to reward value.
(D) Individuals’ neural sensitivity to expected number of lives saved (Expected
Value) in these regions of ventral striatum correlates with individuals’ behav-
ioral sensitivity to Expected Value. Pearson’s r values are supplemented by
p values from a robust regression.
Neuron
Moral Judgments Recruit Core Evaluative Mechanismsvalue) to identify activity in this region, it is unlikely that the value
representations it encodes correspond precisely to this objective
parameter. Rather, the activity in this region more likely reflects
a subjective valuation function that is sensitive to expected
value, but also sensitive to factors related to the individual’s prior
experience and present context. This is consistent with our
finding that subjects’ judgments are sensitive to gain/loss
framing and appear to be better predicted by a log-transformed
magnitude function. Our whole-brain search for brain regions
sensitive to expected moral value and its components revealed
effects in a number of regions in addition to the vmPFC/mOFC
(see Table 1). The respective contributions of these brain regions
to complex moral decision making remains a topic for future
research.
Also consistent with studies of economic decision making
(Knutson et al., 2005; Tom et al., 2007), we found that BOLD
signal in regions of central insula, dorsal striatum, and anterior
and posterior cingulate cortices was sensitive to the magnitude
of the potential loss/gain associated with decision options. Also
consistent with previous studies of decision making (particularly
ones involving the assessment of risk) (Paulus et al., 2003; Qin
and Han, 2009), we found that BOLD signal in the left posterior
insula was sensitive to the probability of loss/gain associated672 Neuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.with decision options. Among the key limitations of the present
paradigm is that valence at encoding cannot be determined
based on the task alone. That is, a larger group to be rescued
may be seen as positive (more people who can be saved) or
negative (more people in danger). The pattern of activations in
the ventral posterolateral thalamus, cingulate cortex, secondary
somatosensory cortex, and insula for the Magnitude and/or
Probability regressors suggests aversive representations similar
to those observed in anticipation of, and response to, nocicep-
tive stimuli (Craig, 2002; Price, 2000) and to more abstract nega-
tive outcomes (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Knutson and Greer,
2008). We note, however, that these results alone are insufficient
to make strong inferences concerning the valence of the repre-
sentations of these parameters. We conducted a follow-up
experiment to determine whether subjects viewed the available
outcomes as consistently negative, consistently positive, or
not consistently either. Self-report data were collected following
the Likert scale and binary choice experiments described above
(both gain frame; see Supplemental Information). A majority of
participants, 54.4%, reported experiencing the dilemmas as
Figure 6. Regions Exhibiting Significant Parametric Increases in
BOLDActivity with Increased Tendency toward Utilitarian Judgment
at the Individual Level
These include bilateral regions of lateral OFC/vlPFC, medial superior frontal
gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus, and superior parietal lobe. No regions
exhibited opposite effects. Statistical maps represent t values thresholded
at a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.005 and a clusterwise threshold of
p < 0.05. See also Table S1.
Figure 7. Regions Exhibiting Significant Parametric Increases in
BOLD Activity with Increased Certainty of Saving/Losing Lives
If No Action Is Taken (Quadratic Function of Probability)
These include bilateral vlPFC, precuneus, inferior parietal lobe, SMA, SFG, and
left lateral PFC. No regions exhibited opposite effects. Statistical maps repre-
sent t values thresholded at a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.005 and a cluster-
wise threshold of p < 0.05. See also Table S2.
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encing them as between two good outcomes, and 28% viewed
the outcomes as having mixed valences.
We uncovered further parallels between complex moral
decision making and economic decision making at the level of
individual differences. Two brain regions, the right anterior insula
and the ventral striatum, were selected a priori for analysis based
on prior findings identifying them, respectively, as sensitive to
risk (Mohr et al., 2010; Paulus et al., 2003; Venkatraman et al.,
2009) and reward value (Knutson et al., 2005; Tom et al., 2007;
Venkatraman et al., 2009; Yacubian et al., 2007). As predicted,
we found that individual differences in behavioral sensitivity to
the probability of others’ deaths (the parameter most closely
approximating ‘‘risk,’’ as defined in the relevant literature) were
correlated with individual differences in BOLD sensitivity to this
parameter in the right insula. Comparable effects were observed
bilaterally in the ventral striatum, correlating neural sensitivity to
expected value with behavioral sensitivity to expected value.
Thus, our results suggest that an individual’s sensitivity to lives
saved/lost in the context of moral judgment is in part determined
by the same mechanisms that determine that individual’s sensi-
tivity to the probability of loss and to overall reward in the context
of self-interested economic decision making.
Subjects exhibited systematically different patterns of neural
activity in response to moral decisions involving more versus
less uncertainty. Trials involving more certain outcomes (i.e.,
nearer to 0% or 100% outcome probability) elicited increasedactivity in ventrolateral and left lateral regions of PFC. This may
be because these trials require less weighing and integration
across parameters (Magnitude and Probability) and may instead
be made simply on the basis of Magnitude. This interpretation is
consistent with research on humans and nonhuman primates
implicating the lateral PFC (especially left hemisphere) in ‘‘top
down’’ action selection in the service of achieving more
distant/abstract goals (Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Koechlin
et al., 2003; Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Little is known about the neural bases of individual differences
in utilitarian tendency, i.e., the tendency to favor options maxi-
mizing aggregate welfare over options with other desirable
features, such as promoting equality (Hsu et al., 2008). We found
that increased activity in bilateral lateral OFC (anterior and
ventral to the OFC region identified in association with outcome
certainty) was associated with more frequent endorsement of
utilitarian trade-offs. According to Greene et al.’s dual-process
theory of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008), util-
itarian judgments are driven primarily by controlled cognitive
processes, which may compete with countervailing emotional
responses. These results are broadly consistent with this dual-
process theory, given the implication of lateral OFC in reducing
the influence of emotional distracters on judgments (Beer
et al., 2006b), regulating pain and negative emotions (Phan
et al., 2005; Wager et al., 2004), favoring delayed rewards over
more immediate ones (Boettiger et al., 2007), inhibiting socially
inappropriate behaviors (Beer et al., 2006a), and more generallyNeuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 673
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with the pursuit of more distal goals (Beer et al., 2006b; Hooker
and Knight, 2006; Kim and Hamann, 2007; Watanabe and
Sakagami, 2007). However, previous research has associated
utilitarian judgment with increased activity in the dorsolateral
PFC (Greene et al., 2004), rather than lateral OFC. These two
findings may perhaps be reconciled as reflections of different
types of affective regulation, corresponding to the demands of
two related, but functionally distinct, moral judgment tasks. It
was hypothesized that previous results (Greene et al., 2004)
reflect the regulation of emotions through effortful cognitive
control whereas, in contrast, the present results may reflect
more implicit modulation of affective representations. In other
words, the present use of repeated, incrementally varied affec-
tive stimuli may elicit a modulation of ‘‘bottom-up’’ affective
influences on judgments, consistent with the aforementioned
literature implicating the lateral OFC in performing a gating or
weighing function (Beer et al., 2006b; Rule et al., 2002; Wager
et al., 2004), as opposed to the overriding of a prepotent
response (Cunningham et al., 2004). We also note that the
present effect in the OFC reflects individual differences, as
opposed to within-individual differences between response
types. An alternative account of the effect of utilitarian tendency
in the OFC derives from an alternative account of OFC function
according to which the value of positively valenced outcomes
are encoded more medially and negatively valenced outcomes
more laterally (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Ursu et al., 2008).
Thus, it could be that subjects who rated saving the group as
more acceptable were guided by more robust negative repre-
sentations of the deaths of those individuals.
Our general finding of considerable overlap between
economic decision making and moral decision making (of the
present sort) is notable for several reasons. As noted above,
the choices our subjects faced concerned saving lives as
opposed to more modest rewards/punishments, concerned
outcomes for others rather than for the decision maker him/
herself, were hypothetical (by ethical necessity), and required
the generation of ratings of moral acceptability rather than the
indication of a personal preference. In light of these features,
one might expect the present judgments to depend primarily
on neural circuitry that is independent of those responsible for
the representation of value in the context of basic, self-interested
decision making, and yet that was not the case. We emphasize
that our use of hypothetical decisions (ordinarily considered
a limitation) underscores the present conclusions: even moral
decisions concerning outcomes for hypothetical others depend
on mechanisms engaged by basic, self-interested decision
making with real material rewards. We also note that our findings
are broadly consistent with recent research on the neural bases
of decisions to make charitable donations (Hare et al., 2010; Hsu
et al., 2008; Moll et al., 2006). The convergence between our
results and those involving more familiar rewards (e.g., food,
money) speaks to the flexibility and domain generality of valua-
tion circuitry highlighted here (Rangel et al., 2008). Likewise, in
implicating domain-general mechanisms, our results speak
against the hypothesis that moral judgments are produced
by a dedicated, domain-specific ‘‘organ’’ for moral judgment
(Hauser, 2006; Huebner et al., 2009). With respect to this issue,674 Neuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.we note that the processes implicated here are not implicated
as secondary modulatory processes, but rather as core evalua-
tive processes, much as they are implicated elsewhere.
More generally, these findings may illuminate the mechanisms
behind some of our most important social decisions, namely
policy decisions involving uncertainty and life-and-death stakes
for large numbers of people. Research on judgment and decision
making indicates that such judgments often rely on heuristics
and are, for this reason among others, subject to systematic
biases (Kahneman, 2003; Slovic, 2007). Recent research has
examined the neural bases of such biases, implicating many of
the structures identified in the present research (De Martino
et al., 2006, 2009; Tom et al., 2007). If, as the present results
suggest, the neural mechanisms we use to think about complex,
life-and-death moral decisions are in fact mechanisms originally
adapted primarily for other purposes (e.g., foraging for food),
then it becomesmore likely that such decisions aremade subop-
timally. While the present results do not underwrite any specific
policy recommendations, it is possible that a better under-
standing of our most basic and general decision-making
systems will fruitfully illuminate the strengths and limitations of
the capacities upon which we rely in making socially significant
moral decisions.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Forty right-handed subjects (twenty female) with no reported history of neuro-
logical/psychological disorder were recruited for this study. Of these, five were
excluded prior to fMRI analysis—one for an incomplete session, one for
a neurological abnormality that was discovered during the imaging session,
one for excessive response failure (30%), and two for failing our catch trial
criteria (see below). One additional subject was excluded due to excessive
MR signal artifact. Following exclusions, data from 34 subjects (17 female,
mean age 24.3, age range 18–42 years old) were analyzed.
Imaging Methods
Images were acquired using a 3.0 T Siemens Magnetom Tim Trio full-body
scanner at the Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging of Massachusetts
General Hospital. A high-resolution, whole-brain structural scan (1 mm
isotropic voxel MPRAGE) was acquired prior to functional imaging. T2*-
weighted functional images were acquired in 36 axial slices parallel to the
AC-PC line with a 0.5 mm interslice gap, affording full-brain coverage. Images
were acquired using an EPI pulse sequence, with a TR of 2500 ms, a TE of
28 ms, a flip angle of 90, an FOV of 256 mm and 96 3 96 matrix (resulting in
3.0 mm isotropic voxels). Four additional images included at the start of
each functional run to allow for signal stabilization were discarded. Stimulus
presentation and response collection were performed using Psychtoolbox
(http://www.psychtoolbox.org) running on Matlab (http://www.mathworks.
com).
fMRI Task
Subjects were presented with 5 different scenarios (one per run) in which they
evaluated the moral acceptability of actions within the context of that scenario
(Figure 1). In all scenarios a proposed action (e.g., redirecting a rescue boat)
would result in the certain death of one individual but would save the lives of
a group of other individuals with a specified probability. The initial scenario
descriptions left unstated the group size (Magnitude) and likelihood that the
group will survive if the proposed action is not taken (Probability).
After reading each scenario description, subjects completed ten trials in
which variable values of Magnitude and Probability were provided (on L and
R screen, respectively) with a short description of what the values represent
within the scenario. Subjects were given up to ten seconds to respond by
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Moral Judgments Recruit Core Evaluative Mechanismspressing one of five buttons (right hand), rating the moral acceptability of the
action on a five-point scale ranging from ‘‘Completely Unacceptable’’ (1) to
‘‘Completely Acceptable’’ (5). This scale was used in place of a dichotomous
forced-choice response to reduce the likelihood that subjects would use an
explicit strategy (e.g., based on threshold values of Magnitude and/or Proba-
bility). A 10 s fixation ITI followed each response as well as the initial scenario
description. An additional 5 s of fixation concluded each run. In total, subjects
completed five fMRI runs, each consisting of 10 trials, for a total of 50 trials.
Magnitude and Probability values for each trial were chosen pseudo-
randomly from 50 unique pairs derived from a full factorial model containing
six levels of Magnitude (2, 3, 10, 15, 25, 40 lives) and eight levels of Probability
(0%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95% likelihood of alternative rescue).
The ‘‘expected moral value’’ (Expected Value) of a given trial/action is the
product of the Magnitude and Probability parameters (Figure 2A). Trials in
which the Expected Value of action exceeds the Expected Value of inaction
are shown in blue. Subjects completed two sets of four practice trials (two
separate scenarios) prior to entering the scanner. We included two additional
catch trials with Probability set to 100% and Magnitude selected randomly
from among the six levels. Subjects were excluded if they rated they rated
the actions in both catch trials higher than 2 (i.e., endorsing the abandonment
of a victim in order to save others who will be saved no matter what). Catch
trials and trials in which the subject failed to respond within 10 s were modeled
together as a condition of no interest within the fMRI analysis (see below). See
Supplemental Information for complete testing materials.Image Processing and Analysis
Imaging analysis was performed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Images were
spatially aligned to the first volume, then spatially normalized to a standard
T2* template and resampled to 2 mm isotropic voxels, then smoothed using
a Gaussian kernel (FWHM 6 mm). Each run was individually high-pass filtered
using a cut-off period of 128 s.
Individual subject data were analyzed using a general linear model (GLM).
Events were modeled with a variable-duration boxcar function convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF), including an addi-
tional regressor modeling the first temporal derivative. Within each run, the
initial reading event (reading the general scenario description) as well as any
error trials were modeled as separate event types that were also convolved
with canonical HRF’s as regressors of no interest. Judgment events (moral
evaluation of proposed actions given specific Magnitude and Probability
values) were modeled beginning 1 s following the onset of the prompt to allow
for reading/encoding of the Magnitude/Probability values. Judgment trials
were modeled with parametric regressors modeling (in the following order)
reaction time (RT), Magnitude (the number of people potentially saved by the
action, natural-log transformed), Probability (the probability that the group
will die if the proposed action is not taken, i.e., 1 minus the probability of alter-
native rescue, as shown to subjects), and Expected Value (the number of lives
expected to be saved, i.e., the multiplicative interaction of Magnitude and
Probability). All effects were modeled as linear functions of parameters with
the exception of the quadratic function used to model the effect of Probability
in the analysis of (un)certainty. (High certainty corresponds to both high and
low Probability values.) Regressors were serially orthogonalized, with later-
entered regressors accounting only for variance unaccounted for by earlier-
entered regressors. Thus, all effects are controlled for RT and effects of
Expected Value are effects over and above its individual components.
First-level (single subject) contrasts were performed separately over the
mean judgment trial activity (relative to baseline) and for each of the parametric
regressors described above (with the exception of RT). Second-level (group)
random effects analyses then proceeded by performing one-sample t tests
over each of these contrasts. For whole-brain analyses, resulting statistical
maps were submitted to a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.005 and a cluster
extent threshold resulting in a whole-brain corrected cluster-wise p < 0.05.
Cluster extent thresholds were determined separately for each analysis using
John Ashburner’s CorrClustTh script (http://www.sph.umich.edu/nichols/
JohnsGems2.html), resulting in minimum thresholds ranging from 178 to 206
voxels in extent.Planned region-of-interest (ROI) analyses to explore behavioral/neural
sensitivity to risk and value were performed in right anterior insula and bilateral
ventral striatum, respectively. Spherical ROI’s were centered on MNI-coordi-
nate space transformed peak activations from Paulus et al. (2003) (MNI
x,y,z: 32,18,9; 6 mm radius) and Knutson et al. (2005) (MNI x,y,z: 15,11,1;
14,14,1; both 4.5 mm radius). Standardized contrast estimates for the relevant
parametric regressor were extracted and averaged across each anatomical
ROI. Behavioral sensitivity for Probability and Expected Values were calcu-
lated as regression coefficients derived from independent single-subject
regressions of acceptability ratings on those single regressors. These
measures of behavioral sensitivity thus reflected the degree to which the given
parameter (Probability or [log-]Expected Value) influenced a subject’s judg-
ment of allowing an individual to die. The contrast estimates extracted from
ROIs (R-aIns or vStr, respectively) likewise reflected the degree to which
a subject’s BOLD signal in that region was influenced by the relevant param-
eter. These two estimates (behavioral and neural) were correlated to test
whether the neural sensitivity of a given region (e.g., vStr) to a specific param-
eter (e.g., Expected Value) predicted the sensitivity of their judgments to this
same parameter (i.e., the degree to which their ratings of acceptability were
influenced by changes in this parameter). In order to minimize any influence
of outliers, tests of significant correlations between neural and behavioral
sensitivity estimates were calculated using robust regression (iteratively
reweighted least-squares approach), supplementing the Pearson’s r values
reported.
Visualization of Results
CARET software (http://brainmap.wustl.edu) was used to map group-level
statistical maps (volumetric maps thresholded and masked to include only
clusters that met the criteria described above) onto a cortical surface
rendering, using the Probablistic Average Landmark and Surface-Based
(PALS) atlas (Van Essen, 2005). A multifiducial mapping technique (Van Essen,
2005) was employed and surface statistical values were interpolated, with the
goal of achieving better estimates of cluster extent along the cortical surface at
the cost of precision in absolute statistical values. For completeness, surface
renderings are shown alongside axial slices of an averaged MNI structural
volume showing the group statistical maps which are being projected. Slices
were chosen to focus more directly on subcortical structures.
Follow-Up Behavioral Experiments
Two additional experiments were performed outside of the MR scanner to
examine the generalizability of the behavioral results of our fMRI experiment.
All task parameters, testing materials, and exclusionary criteria were identical
to those used in the original task unless otherwise stated.
Choice Task
Subjects (n = 22, 13 female) completed a task identical to the fMRI task except
that participants were instructed to provide responses given a binary choice
rather than a graded moral acceptability scale. Rather than responding using
a 1–5 scale appearing at the bottom of each trial slide, subjects indicated
whether they preferred to ‘‘Stay’’ or ‘‘Switch’’ (mapped to key presses 1 and
2, respectively). The final slide of the dilemma text before they began the trials
reminded themwhich option corresponded to Stay (e.g., continue on course to
save one drowning man) versus Switch (e.g., change course to save the group
instead). Choices were regressed against log-Expected Value, using a logit
model, and each subject’s resulting model was used to determine the
expected value of lives saved at each subject’s indifference point, i.e., the
point at which the subject is equally likely to Stay or Switch. These expected
value estimates were restricted to the range of expected values presented
to subjects (0.1–40), such that values less than ln(0.1) or greater than ln(40)
were set to ln(0.1) or ln(40), respectively. This limited the impact of extreme
values and thus made for a more conservative test of our hypotheses, given
our prediction that mean EV at the indifference point will be greater than 1.
Framing Task
Two groups of subjects completed a task identical to the fMRI task except
that, for one group, the descriptions of the options employed a Loss frame
rather than a Gain frame. The Gain frame group (n = 23, 12 female) was pre-
sented with options described in terms of the number of lives that could other-
wise be saved, while the Loss frame group (n = 21, 10 female) was presentedNeuron 67, 667–677, August 26, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 675
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could be lost. (see Supplemental Information for wording details). For the Loss
frame group, probability values were presented as the original Probability
values subtracted from 100. Ratings were regressed (using robust regression)
against Expected Value (natural-log transformed) and each subject’s resulting
model was used to determine the expected value of lives saved at each
subject’s indifference point (the midpoint of the 1–5 scale). In order to directly
compare the acceptability ratings and binary choice data, an additional anal-
ysis was performed whereby ratings from the Gain frame group were trans-
formed to binary choices (ratings of 1–2 as ‘‘Stay,’’ 4–5 as ‘‘Switch,’’ and trials
with a response of 3 excluded). The expected value at each subject’s indiffer-
ence point was determined as described above for the choice task data.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes one figure, two tables, and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.07.020.
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